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Abstract 
This paper presents pretending as an enacted and fundamentally social activity. First, it 
demonstrates why we should think of pretense as inherently social. Then, it shows how 
that fact affects our theory in terms of what is needed in order to pretend. Standardly, 
pretense is seen as requiring a mechanism that allows one to bypass the “obvious” re-
sponse to the environment in order to opt for a symbolic response; that mechanism is im-
aginative and representational. 
This paper shows that the Enactive Account of Pretense reconsiders the idea that one needs 
to respond to an absent environment when pretending, proposing instead that socially con-
stituted perceptual affordances for play allow for non-obvious ways of responding to the 
present environment. The enactive account of pretense suggests that one need not posit 
special cognitive pretense mechanisms and mental scripts in order to account for pretend-
ing, as available capacities for active perception and re-enactment of routines suffice. 
This paper concludes with suggestions for the kinds of cognitive skills that should be 
sought out to explain pretense.  




Pretending is part and parcel of our culture, taking part in the institutionalization of our 
lives (for example, taking on social roles). It refers to a myriad of activities, including 
playing with toys, role-playing, or playing with an imaginary friend. Apart from play, 
pretending also occurs in acting and deceiving. There is an ongoing debate over whether 
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the forms of interaction of very young children and animals can genuinely count as pre-
tense. While pretending can be associated with behavior like teasing at an early age, or 
animal behaviors such as camouflaging and deception (Mitchell, 2002), what is debated is 
whether these are genuine cognitive acts of pretense as opposed to behaviors resembling 
pretense. It has been suggested that due to the rich variety of phenomena that the term 
“pretense” covers, it should be treated as an umbrella term, which relates the various phe-
nomena it encompasses through a family resemblance. It may be possible that these phe-
nomena lack a common core.  
However, many look for a common core in pretense, and agree that pretending activities 
are necessarily symbolic. Standardly, pretense is seen as requiring an individual, represen-
tational capacity that allows one to think, or imagine, one thing as another. While various 
Special Pretense Mechanisms (henceforth: SPMs) have been proposed to account for pre-
tense (Leslie, 1987; Nichols & Stich, 2000, 2003; Harris, 2000; Currie, 2004), what they 
have in common is that they have been proposed as responses to what I will characterize 
as the “bypassing challenge,” or the challenge of how to explain that in pretense, one by-
passes the typical, or “obvious” response to the environment in order to opt for a symbolic 
response (Picciuto & Carruthers, 2016).  
This paper will defend two proposals: first, that pretending is best described not as an 
individual capacity, but inherently as a social activity, and second, that such account of 
pretend activities is to be found in enactive theories of perception and in enacted routines, 
not in SPMs that invoke imagination-as-representation and mental scripts. The enactive 
account of pretense, which takes sociality to be constitutive of pretense, reconsiders the 
idea that one responds to an absent environment while pretending, and proposes that af-
fordances for play shaped by social norms are present in the play environment instead. It 
proposes that pretending is not dependent on mentally representing an absent entity, but is 
a form of enacting or presenting a possible situation in action instead, which follows on 
from re-enacting social norms.  
This position stands in sharp contrast to the cognitivist view of pretense, which sees pretense 
as requiring a form of individual cognitive capacity for offline imagination and mental rep-
resentation; instead it builds on active perception and re-enactment of routines, not guided 
by SPMs, to account for pretending. Ultimately, the paper shows that the bypassing chal-
lenge is not a challenge for enactivists: there are no obvious and non-obvious ways of re-
sponding to the environment, as all responses are shaped by social norms, and possibilities 
for pretend actions are just as present in the environment as standard ways of responding to 
it. This makes looking for SPMs a moot activity, and other capacities and mechanisms un-
derlying pretend play should be evaluated—as will be proposed in the last section. 
The paper will unfold in the following manner. Section 2 provides standard characteriza-
tions of pretense and elucidates the bypassing challenge and SPMs. Section 3 gives rea-
sons to think of pretense as an inherently social activity. Section 4 clarifies the enactivist 
approach to pretense. Section 5 explains how: a) the enactive understanding of perception, 
and b) a proposal for enacted routines, can account for pretending. Section 6 concludes 
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the paper with why the bypassing challenge can be dismissed. Section 7 follows up with 
suggestions of what might be needed for pretense to occur that do not invoke SPMs.  
 
2. Standard Characterizations of Pretense 
Many are inclined to speak of pretense as an activity of symbolic thinking (Piaget, 1962; 
Leslie, 1987; Nichols & Stich, 2000; Mitchell, 2002). Just as symbols stand in for some-
thing else (e.g., a flag stands for country “X”), pretense shows itself as requiring the ability 
to think of one thing (e.g., a banana) as another (e.g., a phone) (Leslie, 1987; Nichols & 
Stich, 2000). Other proposals defer from thinking and conceptualize pretense as a form of 
symbolic seeing of one thing as another (Harris, 1994; Currie, 2004). As Varga (2011, 
p. 47) summarizes, pretend play that is widely seen as symbolic play involves:  
a) object substitution: using an object as if it is something else (e.g., using a toy car 
as an airplane);  
b) attribution of false properties: ascribing a pretend property to something (e.g., 
pretending that the doll’s dry hair is wet, or that the doll is hungry);  
c) reference to an absent object: the invention of an imaginary object (e.g., feeding 
the doll invisible cake) and referring to it as if it were present (see also Leslie 
1987, p. 8).1 
Many in the field are also inclined to characterize these symbolic activities as involving 
mental representations (see Liao & Gendler, 2010).2 For example, Lillard (1994, pp. 212–
214) lists the necessary ingredients of pretense to include a mental representation of the 
pretense scenario in the pretender’s mind, and separately, a mental representation that is 
projected onto reality, and the pretender’s awareness of both the reality and the fact that 
the representation is projected onto the reality. She mentions additional features of pre-
tense, namely non-serious emotional tone, and being an actual activity, but these are not 
seen as constitutive of pretense.  
                                                        
1 Pretense is part of the common development of children (see Liao & Gendler, 2010), and there seems to be a 
developmental trajectory between the above-mentioned capacities. For example, object-substitution play usually 
forms around the age of two; attribution of false properties, visible in role-playing, where the child takes his or 
herself as the object of pretense, is developed around the age of four; and from around the age of six, many 
Western children have imaginary companions (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Taylor, 1999). This is a major step 
in development, as the child does not necessarily act on props, but has conversations with what is described to 
be an “absent” entity. Hence, one might believe that “understanding children’s pretense is necessary to get some 
idea as to the phenomenon itself and its scope” (Mitchell, 2002, p. 4). 
2 Mental representations can be best described as internal models that stand in for the world; they are causally 
potent, information-carrying vehicles that fulfil a condition of satisfaction. They stand in for, and thereby say or 
specify, something about the external world; the nature of specifying is that it can do so accurately or inaccu-
rately, thereby being prone to misrepresentation. 
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The symbolic nature of pretend play is said to require being able to represent one thing as 
another, represent rules, represent absent entities, or represent fact and fiction. The repre-
sentation for pretense is said to be achieved on a subpersonal level of cognition thanks to 
special cognitive mechanisms for pretense. The SPMs include Leslie’s (1987) decoupling 
mechanism, Nichols & Stich’s (2000) inference mechanism, Harris’ (2000) flagging mech-
anism, or Currie’s (2004) decentring, to take but a few examples. I will briefly discuss 
these classic examples from the literature. 
Leslie’s decoupling mechanism “decouples” a primary representation of current percep-
tual situation (this is a banana) from secondary pretense representation by “marking” (or 
making a copy of) the primary representation (“this is a banana”), on which manipulations 
can then be made without losing the original representation (1987, p. 417).3 Nichols & 
Stich (2000) posit an inference mechanism that incorporates a cluster of smaller mecha-
nisms (e.g., Possible World Box and UpDater). The initial premises about the world enter 
the Possible Worlds Box (PWB in short), leaving the Belief Box with the true beliefs (e.g., 
“this is really a banana”) and the Desire Box (really wanting to play banana-phone) intact. 
The PWB is said to quarantine the pretense-initiating representations, and thereby avoids 
representational abuse and conceptual confusion (Nichols & Stich, 2000, p. 136). The Up-
Dater ensures that the beliefs that go into the PWB remain fresh and intact. Harris’ flag-
ging mechanism has been introduced to “flag” a prop (yellow brick) with a representation 
(e.g., “this yellow brick is a banana”) or to flag a specific pretend episode: “During this 
episode, yellow bricks are (make-believe) bananas” (Harris, 2000, p. 66). Harris claims 
that to successfully play banana-phone, a child must “flag,” or act according to a rule, that 
“this banana is not a phone” and edit these rules to generate new flags, with “statements 
written on the various flags” (2000, p. 66). Currie (2004, 2006) claims it is thanks to seeing 
one thing “as” another, or what he calls decentring, that we can explain pretense. Follow-
ing Currie & Ravenscroft’s (2002) proposal for “Recreative Imagination,” which treats 
imagination as a form of off-line simulation of possible scenarios, Currie describes decen-
tring in terms of a shift of perspectives that involves a mechanism for representing and 
manipulating perceptual contents off-line: “Decentring indicates the (relative) freedom 
from environmental constraint and sensitivity to representational content we think of as 
part of rationality” (2004, p. 211). Decentring requires representing the world “as if,” 
based on the capacity to simulate the environment in its absence, and allows for seeing-
as. To see-as, according to Currie, “the pretending creature represents the world, not as it 
is, but as it might be” (2006, p. 276). 
These SPMs proposed in the literature are invoked to answer what I will call the bypassing 
challenge. They are proposed to explain why it is the case that, in pretense, 
[...] an obvious option or response is bypassed, and instead an unobvious option or response 
is selected. If a child looking at a banana is to pretend that the banana is a telephone, then 
                                                        
3 According to Leslie, one also needs to possess and exercise the concept “I PRETEND” to meta-represent one-
self as the agent of the cognitive manipulations. 
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she must bypass the obvious response: her sensory systems will all be informing her that 
what she is looking at is a banana. Instead, she must suppress the obvious tendency to see 
the object as a banana, and select the option of seeing it as a telephone instead. (Picciuto & 
Carruthers, 2016, p. 323, emphasis added) 
The “bypassing challenge” is representative of the standard representational characteriza-
tions of pretense. It suggests that perceptual mechanisms do not suffice to account for 
pretense, as during pretending, one “steps away from what is seen” and acts on what is 
“imagined” instead, in the “absence” of a relevant stimulus. It also suggests that one must 
act in accordance with a different meaning than the one given in the environment.4 It is 
imaginings together with mental scripts for action that are said to be necessary to guide 
pretense (see section 5), as they go beyond mere perception. They require versions of the 
abovementioned SPMs in an individual’s cognitive architecture, which somehow suppress 
one type of content (perceptual content) and proposes another (symbolic content) in its 
place. This is motivated by the idea that in pretense we have to “entertain two representa-
tions of a single situation, one literal/veridical/real and the other nonliteral/distorted/pre-
tend/ imaginary” (Russon, 2002, p. 237).  
However, this paper will propose that the bypassing challenge arises only in a context 
where pretense is seen as requiring transformation of primary or true representations, or 
immediate meanings, as received from the environment, into secondary, fictional or non-
immediate ones that are absent from the environment. This paper will show that with an 
enactive approach to pretense (understood as a constitutively social capacity), the theorist 
can reconceive the ideas about what is perceptually given in the environment, as percep-
tion is influenced by social norms. Enactivism can thereby dismiss the bypassing challenge 
altogether: one does not step away from what is seen, but sees a new affordance for action, 
which is socially established. To promote this position, the sections below will explain 
why pretending can and should be seen as an inherently social activity, and explicate the 
foundation for the Enactive Account of Pretense that promotes this re-description.  
 
3. Pretending as an Inherently Social Activity 
What the classic positions on pretense, that characterize it as representational, fail to ad-
dress is that pretense is more social in nature than initially thought. The classic positions 
emphasize the primacy of individualized mechanisms for pretense and symbol-swapping, 
                                                        
4 A version of the bypassing challenge has been suggested by enactivists as well. For example, as Di Paolo (2016) 
writes, in the context of pretense, I must adopt a “detached observational attitude towards an object,” and in order to 
do that, “I must be able to empty it of its most immediate meaning for myself, to temporarily bracket its significance” 
(p. 245). While Di Paolo does not propose that an internal representational mechanism does that (as “decentring, it 
would seem, is an act” (p. 244), he seems to acknowledge a version of the bypassing challenge. As the paper will 
show, I do not think that this challenge needs to be met at all; one does not need to “empty the attitude from an 
immediate meaning” as, it will be shown, there is no such immediate meaning in the first place. However, I agree 
with Di Paolo that if there is a capacity to detach at play, make-believe is essential in achieving it (pp. 228–229).  
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without considering the primacy of social interactions in shaping pretend engagements, as 
well as their ongoing effect on how pretense takes form.  
To clarify how we can think of the role of the “social” in pretense, I will apply De Jaegher, 
Di Paolo & Gallagher’s (2010) three-fold distinction between a contextual, an enabling or 
a constitutive role for social factors in social cognitive phenomena. As they explain, 
given X, and a particular situation in which X occurs:  
a) F is a contextual factor if variations in F produce variations in X,  
b) C is an enabling condition if the absence of C prevents X from occurring and  
c) P is a constitutive element if P is part of the processes that produce X.  
A contextual factor is simply something that has an effect on X, and can be determined by 
observing how X is changed when the factor is changed. An enabling condition not only 
influences the phenomenon (therefore also being contextual), but is also necessary (either 
contemporaneously or historically) for X to occur. A constitutive element is part of the 
phenomenon (it must be present in the same time frame as the phenomenon) (p. 443).5  
I will apply this distinction, augmented by the addition of a motivational role, to discuss 
the role of social engagements for pretense. These roles can be reconceived as answers to 
the following questions: 
1. Contextual role: what affected how children pretend play? 
2. Enabling role: what affects that children pretend play? 
3. Motivational role: what affects why children pretend play? 
4. Constitutive role: what is part of children’s pretend play? 
 
3.1. Contextual role: what affected how children pretend play? 
That social (and cultural) factors play at least a contextual role in pretense is not contro-
versial and is widely accepted. Looking at the development of the various pretend and 
imaginative practices, we see that they first and foremost occur in a social context. Human 
mothers and siblings are said to “not only ‘enhance’ and ‘elaborate’ infants’ ‘fleeting and 
sporadic’ early attempts to pretend, but initiate, demonstrate and otherwise ‘create a con-
text’ conducive to pretend play until such limited pretending takes hold” (Mitchell, 2002, 
p. 14, original emphasis). According to Taylor (1999, p. 6), the parental reaction to, and 
                                                        
5 De Jaegher et al. (2010) propose an example to clarify these roles: “The three roles follow a scale of increased 
specificity. For instance, a change in air pressure can affect the process of boiling water in an electric kettle, thus 
making it a contextual factor. An enabling condition, in turn, is required for the phenomenon to exist, but it might 
not be constitutive. Boiling water in an electric kettle requires the invention of such an appliance and a supply 
of electricity, although these are not themselves part of the phenomenon—they are enabling conditions. In normal 
conditions, boiling is constituted by an appropriate heat exchange between a metal plate and the water provoking 
a phase transition from liquid to steam” (p. 443). Their paper applies the distinction to social cognition context 
as well; for those examples, see their full paper.  
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interpretation of, childhood fantasies “are likely to affect children’s engagement in pre-
tense, as well as their understanding of the distinction between fantasy and reality.” Even 
a complex pretend activity like playing with an imaginary companion is closely related to 
salient social and relationship issues: “many young children have imaginary companions 
similar to characters they have seen on television or in movies” (p. 6).6  
The phenomenon is also culture-relative. One cross-cultural study (Farver & Howes, 
1993) has shown that Mexican children on average reported less engagements with imag-
inary friends than American children. This difference can be attributed to the parental re-
actions to such play, motivated by cultural norms.7 The qualitative difference given the 
variations in the cultural norms produces variations in pretense behaviors.  
 
3.2. Enabling role: what affects that children pretend play? 
One way of thinking about social factors as enabling pretense is, for example, in terms of 
social engagements that scaffold further interaction (Di Paolo, 2016). Naturalistic obser-
vations suggest that “the infant’s attention and sensorimotor skills are ‘educated’ by con-
text-sensitive scaffolding resulting in a socially guided mastery of attention and object 
manipulation” (Di Paolo, 2016, p. 241), which is also visible in pretending. To take the 
example above, the absence of engaging with others in a normative way could preclude 
pretense from taking place altogether.  
However, in standard cognitivist literature, interaction with others is often seen as a distal 
than a proximal cause of pretend play. The enabling conditions for pretending are given 
mainly to proximate causes of pretense, and these are “mental stand-ins” that cause the 
relevant pretense response to take place (see Section 4 on imaginings and mental scripts 
guiding pretense).8 Hence, with that view, sociality does not play a part in enabling 
                                                        
6 The parental interactions with the child, including reactions to play and demonstrating how to play, might look 
like an example of a developmentally enabling role, not just a contextual one (thanks to the anonymous reviewer 
for this point). However, while it may be historically necessary for pretend play to occur, it is an empirical 
question whether the absence of parental reactions and demonstrations prevent pretense from occurring. At least, 
it is intuitively possible to imagine pretend play taking place without social engagement actively shaping it, 
thought that is an intuition I do not share.  
7 Taylor (1999) suggests that the accepted norms in Mexico, such as belief in the presence of guardian angels 
and spirits, influence the negative evaluation of child’s imaginary play by the parent, who equates it with lying 
behavior. Parental reactions might also lead more directly to causing the play to continue or cease. This shows 
that dividing the contextual from developmentally enabling roles can be rather arbitrary in practice.  
8 Cognitivists look for synchronic causes of cognitive processes in the mental architectures of the cognitive 
agents, clearly separating these causes from diachronic causes, or events “external” to the cognitive process. 
However, this neat distinction might fall apart when considering cognitive processes taking place in time, being 
embedded, extended or distributed to the environment and other agents. Hence, a discussion of the relevant 
notion of causality for enactivists is of high importance, but beyond the scope of this paper.  
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pre⁠tense; it mainly serves contextual and motivational roles. This paper will propose chal-
lenging this view and considering the different means by which we can speak of sociality 
as enabling pretense. 
 
3.3. Motivational role: what affects why children pretend play? 
That social engagements motivate the reason why children engage in pretense has been 
acknowledged. For example, as Picciuto & Carruthers (2016) write,  
[We] rather doubt that the child pretending to be a dead cat is doing it because she thinks 
dead cats are admirable or that it is desirable to be a dead cat. In this case the motivations 
might be social, however. The child pretends something with the goal that it should be found 
amusing by others. Moreover, when children engage in joint pretense, the rewards might 
derive in part from the mere fact of doing something jointly with another person. For children 
(and adults) appear to find joint attention and joint action intrinsically rewarding. (p. 318) 
Gleason (2013) also proposes that “an important feature of [the existence of imaginary rela-
tionships] is social in that they afford a malleable and dynamic forum for practicing, explor-
ing, and managing relationship issues” (p. 252). The suggestion is that one finds affordances 
for pretend play motivated by the desire to practice social situations that have been observed. 
 
3.4. Constitutive role: what is part of children’s pretend play? 
The question at hand is whether or not these social interactions play more than a contextual 
or motivating role for pretense. Classic cognitivist proposals consider social factors as 
external to cognition, and this holds for pretense as well. However, some recent views that 
strongly emphasize the constitutive role of social interaction in shaping pretense have been 
advanced, such as Varga (2011) who writes that “we must conceptualize pretend play as 
an inherently social activity that entails prior understanding of others as intentional agents” 
(p. 48). He says that pretending is not an “individual cognitive phenomenon” whose “focus 
is upon intentional, interpretative abilities that involve both pretend play and social cog-
nition” (p. 47); it is rather already constitutively social to begin with: 
Pretend play is already a cooperative activity of interpersonal sharing long before children 
acquire a concept of belief, or the capacity to meta-represent. The ability to pretend may thus 
only develop in conjunction with intersubjective awareness, through an acquaintance with 
other intentional agents. [...] The point is that the interaction pertinent to social cognition does 
not just lie at the end of a cognitive process, but might already be at the core of intersubjec-
tivity [...] [The] ability to pretend is the ability to engage in a form of interaction or collective 
intentionality that entails prior understanding of others as intentional agents. (p. 50) 
Seeing pretense as inherently social improves our comprehension of this phenomenon. We 
can understand why, for example, autistic children engage in limited forms of pretense; it 
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is not because they lack a developed Theory of Mind,9 but because they may lack the 
ability to engage in shared intentionality.10 The constitutively social account of pretense 
reflects a hypothesis brought forth in Enactive Cognitive Science.  
 
4. Proposal for the Enactive Account of Pretense 
Enactivism is a philosophical framework that emphasizes  
the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world by a 
pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the 
variety of actions that a being in the world performs. (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991, p. 9)  
It stresses the role of the body and the social environment in shaping the mind. The enac-
tive approach to cognition importantly considers the individual in the intersubjective con-
text, and takes into account the role of objects and other people in shaping cognition. The 
outcome of this approach is that it finds mentality in worldly interactions.  
Enactivism has been recently presented as a philosophy of nature (Gallagher, 2017). This 
means that it  
takes seriously the results of science, and its claims remain consistent with them, but it can 
reframe those results to integrate them with results from many sciences. [...] Moreover, the 
requirements of such a reframing may indeed call for a vocabulary that is different from one 
that serves the needs of any particular science. (p. 22)  
Enactivism, therefore, reframes our understanding of what cognition is:  
The explanatory unit of cognition (perception, action, etc.) is not just the brain, or even two 
(or more) brains in the case of social cognition, but dynamic relations between organism and 
environment, or between two or more organisms, which include brains, but also include their 
own structural features that enable specific perception–action loops. (p. 11) 
The main unit of analysis is the organism–environment system, not just the sub-personal 
neural system.11 Furthermore, enactivism can bring together many different theoretical 
                                                        
9 Some argue that a “Theory of Mind,” “mindreading” or the ability to attribute mental states (like beliefs and 
desires so as to make sense of other people) are needed to engage in social interactions and pretense in the first 
place (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Varga reverses this proposal, showing that first comes the understanding of others 
as intentional agents, then pretending, and only then comes the understanding of other minds in a specialized 
“mindreading” way. 
10 Shared intentionality is a basic cognitive capacity, involving the skill of gaze following, emotional attunement, 
and triangulation. It does not require complex propositional attitudes, but an understanding of others as inten-
tional agents. For that, one needs a concept of intentional attitudes, or an ability to track relations between whole 
organisms and salient features of the environment (Hutto, 2008). 




frameworks, such as pragmatism, ecological psychology and phenomenology,12 as well as 
explanatory models, such as sensorimotor theories of perception (O’Regan & Noë, 2001), 
dynamical systems (Chemero, 2009), or even predictive processing mechanisms (Bruine-
berg et al., 2016).13  
The enactive account thereby re-describes what is, and how to explain, pretense as well. 
It proposes that engagement in pretense is highly expressive: rather than being “inside 
one’s head,” it mainly involves manipulating objects in the world and exploring new pos-
sibilities for action (affordances) in engagements with others, which can be perceived in 
action (Rucińska, 2014; 2016; 2017). The ability to see playful affordances in objects, 
combined with embodied actions, is sufficient for some basic types of pretend play. Sen-
sorimotor skills take over the role of off-line imaginative capacities and provide support 
for on-line perceptual-imaginative capacities based on direct perception instead. Other 
people further shape what affordances we see and respond to in the environment, through 
guidance, verbal feedback, reassurances, gestures and other responses, but also, sometimes 
just by their presence. The outcome of this approach is a performative notion of pretense: 
pretend scenarios are presented, performed, or enacted in the world, not represented in 
detachment from the world. According to the enactive view, there is no need to represent 
the play in advance; rather, representing is a result of engaging in pretense.14 
Enactivism, thus, embraces social re-characterizations of the phenomena.15 As Di Paolo 
(2016) acknowledges, perception is influenced by the social world, as “objects themselves, 
the situations they are embedded in, and the practices they involve are largely social in 
origin” (p. 236) and social origins “should not be seen as trivial regarding the effects on 
the development of infant perception and cognition” (p. 236). This means that what we 
see is already shaped by social and cultural practices, which makes a mark on the percep-
tual and cognitive capacities of human agents. According to Di Paolo, social skills in-
volved in responding to each other, such as “linguistic mediation, make-believe play, and 
                                                        
12 For further arguments on possible unification of these fields, see also Heras-Escribano’s (2019) Pragmatism, 
enactivism, and ecological psychology: towards a unified approach to post-cognitivism. 
13 Enactive Cognitive Science might even, in principle, be compatible with certain ways of framing mechanistic 
explanations of phenomena at the relevant level of description, since being mechanistic does not necessarily 
entail representationalism (Miłkowski et al., 2018). However, this point is under much debate and needs more 
space for defending than this paper allows. 
14 By “representing” I mean the activity of showing something or performing a situation. This is a performative 
notion of representation, like an activity found in the arts; it is not a reference to mental representation understood 
as an explanatory posit of cognitive science.  
15 Couldn’t one propose both a representational and a social account of pretense? While such a story could in 
principle be told, enactivism is a philosophical position better placed to account for the sociality of pretend play 
since it considers the dynamical, organism–environment interactions as part of cognition; these interactions in-
volve social environments as well. Representationalist positions are mainly internalist, and would have to pro-
pose both mental representations for social engagements and still need mental representations for pretend 
engagements, and then would have to show how they interact, making such an explanation more demanding.  
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the ability to control perspectival switches are constitutive—i.e. are of the essence—of the 
ability to see objects as present” (pp. 228–229). 
This paper thereby agrees both with Varga and Di Paolo that pretense is a constitutively 
social activity, and suggests that enactivism can propose a story about how sociality plays 
a part in enabling pretense as well.16 This paper will clarify that both active engagement 
with, and passive presence, of the other, guides the pretender to play in a specific way with 
the object at hand.17 The history of interacting with objects can play an enabling role in 
pretense, albeit extended in time: in a playful context, objects invite one to re-enact a fa-
miliar social situation, without following a mental script.  
The enactive account of pretense can therefore suggest some answers to the question “how 
does a child pretend” that will make the role of social interaction even more explicit in 
enabling pretend engagements, without invoking complex representational or imaginary 
toolkits in its story. Enactivist tools will include a sensorimotor and ecological account of 
perception that takes over the role of offline representational processes, as well as the 
enactment of routines instead of invoking of SPMs for internalizing rules of behavior into 
mental scripts. These proposals will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
5. The Role of Perception and Enacted Routines in Pretending 
 
5.1 Perception instead of Imagination  
Across the current theories, pretense is said to require a myriad of cognitive capacities,18 
but the one capacity most often cited is the capacity for imagination. In philosophy of 
mind, pretending is scarcely discussed independently from imagining.19 The concept of 
                                                        
16 If it is plausible that pretense is a constitutively social phenomenon, then it should make room for an explana-
tion of pretense that brings in sociality into the causal structure of the phenomenon. However, to what extent the 
enactive account of pretense alone can provide a satisfactory causal story of cognitive phenomena like pretense, 
whether causal-constitutive divide is relevant for pretense, and whether sociality playing an enabling role can be 
part of a scientific explanation of pretense, are questions fundamental to understanding the full scope of the 
enactive cognitive science, yet far beyond the scope of this paper.  
17 For the purposes of this paper, I will treat a guiding relation as a kind of an enabling relation. I will speak of 
affordances as guiding behaviours, and therefore, I think that they can play a role as enablers of pretense. How-
ever, affordances are not causes in the traditional sense of the term. Defending the position that affordances enter 
into causal relations specifically understood requires further analysis of the notion of causality at play. 
18 These capacities include possession of conceptual knowledge, “double knowledge” (knowledge of what is real 
and not real), intentionality, being in the right mental state, having mental attitudes that are “belief-like,” shifting 
perspectives, mapping and following rules, or meta-communicating (Piaget, 1962; Leslie, 1987; Harris & Ka-
vanaugh, 1993; Lillard, 1994; Mitchell, 2002; Nichols & Stich, 2000, 2003).  
19 For example, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, pretending only features in short subsections of the 
entry on imagination (Gendler, 2011). 
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imagination should also be treated as an umbrella term, encompassing a variety of capac-
ities such as imaging, creative, fabricative or cogitative imagination, or acts of making 
things up (Hacker, 2013). The capacities involved in understanding imagination involve 
perceiving, remembering, thinking and playing, and it is not inconceivable that many of 
the distinguished categories actually overlap in practice (e.g., the “visualizing” aspect of 
imaging, and the “seeing as” aspect of perceptual imagination). While a number of inter-
pretations over the nature of imagination are available (Beaney, 2010), imagination is also 
often characterized as representational. For example, Veneziano (2002, p. 60) describes 
imagination as implying “some displacement from the reality plane and thus meaning 
transformations relative to the meaning that the actions and the objects involved would 
have were they considered literally,” where meaning transformations can be understood 
as manipulations of representational contents.  
Imagination is said to play a key role in pretense. It enables counterfactual thinking or 
simulating perspectives, guiding and elaborating pretense as it unfolds. To quote Kind 
(2013, p. 142),  
Philosophers have assigned imagination an especially central role in [engagement with fic-
tion, pretense, mindreading, modal epistemology]. [In a pretense context,] imagination is 
supposed to explain why we take the actions that we do when engaging in games of pretend. 
[For example,] in pretending to be a Jedi Knight, Christopher imagines that the tree branch 
in his hand is a light saber. 
The most current account of pretense characterizes pretense as embodied imagination (Pic-
ciuto & Carruthers 2016). As they write, embodiment is important for pretense, as “you 
cannot pretend without overtly doing anything” (2016, p. 314). But what makes pretense 
special, or different, from mere acting as if, is the involvement of imagination that actively 
guides the pretense. They write that  
[...] [To] pretend that P is to act as if P (without believing it) while imagining that P. A child 
who pretends that the banana is a telephone needs to suppose that the banana is a telephone, 
or to imagine the banana as a telephone, and act accordingly. [...] Indeed, when pretending 
one performs an action of one sort (holding a banana to one’s ear, say) not only while imag-
ining it as an action of a different sort (talking on a telephone), but because one does so. For 
this reason, we think that pretending only lasts for as long as imagination actively guides 
one’s movements. (p. 317)20  
                                                        
20 The view that imagination (understood as a representational capacity) guides pretense is already visible in the 
work of Walton (1990). Walton says that “a child playing with a toy truck does not merely look at it and imagine 
what it prompts him to imagine. He ‘makes it go’—fast or slow, into one room and another, and so on. When he 
does he imagines a (real) truck behaving in these ways. The toy is hardly to be credited with prompting these 
imaginings, nor is its movements. He made the toy move in certain ways because of how he wanted to imagine 
a truck moving, rather than vice versa” (1990, p. 24). 
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How imagination guides pretense is by allowing one to represent counterfactual situations. 
How imagination achieves this is presumably via manipulating mental representations of 
counterfactual situations in SPMs, as suggested in section 2 (e.g., Currie’s decentring).  
In contrast to imagination-based accounts of pretense, enactivism can offer a perception-
based account of pretense.21 The enactive account shows how the sensorimotor account of 
perception (O’Regan & Noë, 2001) allows us to understand pretense in action. It promotes 
a view of perception that is intimately linked with action. O’Regan & Noë follow the motto 
that perceiving is something we do. They claim that  
A crucial feature of our theory […] is the involvement of the body in experience. The pecu-
liar, sensory, quality of our perceptual experience consists (in part) in the fact that move-
ments of the body produce changes in our sensory stimulation. (2001, p. 1016) 
The sensorimotor approach to perception relies on the “situated, active agent, as constitut-
ing perceptual objects in a structured coupling with the environment” (Di Paolo 2016, 
pp. 233–234). Action changes how we perceive the world and explains how we get to see 
things in new ways. For example, when dealing with a banana, the features of the object 
(its shape and size), and the children’s sensorimotor capacities, mutually interact so as to 
allow the child to lift the banana to the ear and begin to treat it as if it were a phone. 
Depending on the body of the agent (e.g., having a hand that can grip objects, having a 
functioning arm that can bend), an object like a banana can be grasped and brought to their 
head with minimal effort.  
Apart from perception being embodied and being for action, action shapes the capacity to 
perceive. This idea is strongly highlighted in Ecological Psychology. Gibsonians appeal 
to “perception-action loops” that refer “to the necessity of a dynamical interaction of the 
perceiver and the environment in order to generate, and be able to pick up [ecological 
information]” (Travieso, et al., 2014, p. 386). Gibson (1979) also introduced the notion of 
affordances, or possibilities for action that are available for perception. The ecological 
account of perception could describe the play situation as involving different informational 
invariants coming up in that context. What could be seen in the interaction are not neces-
sarily the typical meanings of objects (the assumption that when seeing a phone, one first 
represents it “as a phone”), but the new meanings that are relevant to the play context and 
which emerge through play. 
In the enactive account of perception, what we perceive is what we can do with the object 
now, irrespective of how it is typically conceptualized. As perception is not given, but 
                                                        
21 This is not to suggest that even Radical Enactivism cannot account for imagination; there are available proposals 
in the literature that seek to explain imagination through the enactivist, non-representational lens (see, e.g., chapter 
8 of Hutto & Myin, 2017, or chapter 10.2 of Gallagher, 2017). Rather, this paper follows the position that if imag-
ination or imaginative capacities are necessarily representational and different from perceptual capacities due to 
their involving representing special representational contents, then the enactive account does not need to refer to 
such imaginative capacities to make sense of pretense. Enactive account of perception will suffice. 
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acted out, one sees what is relevant in a situation and what one can do with an object, 
instead of what it typically means.22 Often, what is relevant in play is different than what 
is relevant for daily life. Thus, one may be able to see chairs as “for jumping on” in play 
context, instead of as “for sitting on” in everyday context. Seeing a banana “as a banana” 
per se or a chair “as a chair” per se is seeing for the act of contemplation of these objects, 
something we actually rarely engage in. As Di Paolo (2016) captures nicely,  
I am hardly ever confronted with abstract objects, which I regard and inspect in their percep-
tual presence in a manner devoid of interest or social value. Most of the time, I work my way 
around a world of social and biological purposes and norms, for which objects are seldom 
present to me as the bottles or tomatoes that populate the examples of perceptual presence in 
the sensorimotor literature. (pp. 229–230) 
For example, in a banana we could see the possibility of enacting a “phone” routine in the 
context of play; in a chair we could see the possibility of enacting a “mountain climbing” 
routine, etc. Hence, one does not just see an object or an action “in itself,” but sees the 
potential actions one could engage in with that object. As bananas afford both eating and 
playing phone with, both actions are available to perception. I see the banana not as an 
object in-itself with a fixed meaning; I see the banana in terms of how I can use it, given 
in a specific context. And I certainly don’t see two bananas—banana qua banana and ba-
nana qua phone.23 According to the enactive account, there is no true representation of 
affairs (e.g., seeing chairs “as chairs”) that takes priority; the meaning emerges in a spe-
cific interaction, at a specific time and place. Sitting down on chairs is simply a more 
common situation in which we find ourselves. 
That the perceptual account can be applied to the pretense context in order to explain the 
emergence of symbolic thought has already been suggested in the psychological literature 
that follows Ecological Psychology. Szokolszky (2006), for example, argues that the mak-
ing of new metaphors is a perceptually guided process: 
Perception is direct in being unmediated by mental representations of the world. In accord-
ance with this view we suggest that at the heart of metaphor is the direct pick-up of (reso-
nance to) an invariant pattern in an informational array that is specific to both the topic and 
the vehicle (such as, for flowers and fireworks, invariants that specify progressive expansion 
from a central point). In this way, metaphor, as other forms of knowing, relies on a funda-
mentally perceptual process. (p. 87) 
                                                        
22 We can compare the enactive view of perception to the standard theory of perception to understand its rele-
vance for pretending. According to the standard theory, perception is understood as requiring storage of sensory 
information from the world and being able to make an inference, or mental reconstruction, of the external world. 
Sensory systems are informing one about what one sees, which makes perception something “given.” When one 
perceives the object one plays with (a banana), one already represents it in perception “as a banana,” and there-
fore, needs some form of a process whereby one treats the banana as something else. Only with a decoupling or 
decentring mechanism in place, one can engage in pretend play.  
23 Thanks to Shaun Gallagher for this phrasing. 
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Hence, it could be said that in manipulating an object, one is treating it metaphorically. 
The metaphor is thereby “not sitting in the head,” but enacted (Gallagher, 2017). 
Thus, the enactive account of perception that brings in the sensorimotor and the Gibsonian 
account of perception allows for a new proposal of seeing-affordances-in action, instead 
of engaging in representational seeing-as (Rucińska, 2014). Seeing-affordances-in is an 
account of how objects and situations may be engaged with, using a basic capacity such 
as a sensorimotor mechanism to actively explore objects in the world. Such embodied 
explorations can open up seeing possibilities for new forms of engagements in play.  
This suggests that no special mechanism is needed to quarantine one meaning from the 
other; only one of the meanings is perceptually relevant at the time. How it is that “phone” 
play specifically gets afforded will be determined by the context of the play that involves 
social norms and acceptances of playing in a certain way.24 This will be elaborated on in 
the next section, where what is needed instead of mental scripts to guide specific action 
will be discussed.  
 
5.2. Enacted Routines instead of Mental Scripts 
How do we get to play in a specific way? Don’t we need scripts, or representations of 
situations, to guide play? Often suggested in literature on pretense is the idea that in order 
to be guided by past experiences, one must represent them as rules for behavior and inter-
nalize them into schemas or scripts. The standard story proposes script-following as being 
crucial for guiding pretense. Written scripts, such as those produced by playwrights, detail 
the way the action unfolds. The assumption is that the scripts that guide pretense must be 
internalized or crafted internally into mental scripts. Mental scripts are clusters of mental 
contents whose role is to be “detailing the way in which certain situations typically unfold” 
(Nichols & Stich, 2003, p. 34).  
Nichols & Stich compare the scripts to plans for actions. Scripts are said to play a specific 
explanatory role: they are supposed to guide what is to be pretended, how it is pretended, 
and how the pretense gets to be elaborated. To play their guiding role, the first assumption 
about the scripts is that they must be decoupled from the world: “(In) normal development 
children acquire ‘an increasing capacity for internal creation of a complex script’ which is 
detached from ‘the external context’” (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993, p. 234). However, they 
also should stand in close proximity to the external context, in order to reflect it. Thus, the 
second assumption is that an elaboration of the narrative occurs in a separate module: 
“Since the representations in the child’s Belief Box are closely tied to the external context, 
this ‘complex script’ must be elaborated in some functionally distinct component of the 
                                                        
24 For example, to explain how specific “phone” play gets afforded to the subject in a particular context is a 
question that involves various components, including the aspects of the tool (the banana can solicit “phone” 
because its shape and size correspond to that of a [now old-fashioned] phone) and the aspects of individual 
differences (background knowledge, skills, moods). 
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mind” (Nichols & Stich, 2000, p. 45). This leads to proposals such as positing of an SPM 
for flagging, or the Script Elaborator and the Possible World Box modules (see Section 2). 
For example, it is the PWB that manipulates mental scripts (2003, p. 34), spelling out what 
the world would be like in the imagined counterfactual scenario. The Script Elaborator then 
specifies how things will unfold or develop (2000, p. 127). With this model, the Script 
Elaborator is thereby responsible for the novelty and creativity of pretense. 
However, apart from the questionable metaphysical status of the SPMs and the general 
worry of where they get their novel content from, why assume that the elaboration of the 
script, or new script creation, must occur in a functionally distinct component of the mind, 
or be detached from the immediate world? Must we be guided by scripts at all? Funkhouser 
& Spaulding (2009) seem to take a less internalist stance and argue for the active role of 
the external script (or “script outside the agent”) in shaping pretend play. The external 
script includes “a physical script, the behavior of another individual, or a social norm” 
(p. 310). They allow external scripts to guide only “in conjunction with internal scripts,” 
understood as mental scripts or represented “maps by which we steer; directors; means 
selectors” (p. 307). The assumption behind looking for internal scripts that guide action is 
a worry about how else to understand the directedness of play in the “absence” of direct 
stimulus, and a lack of understanding in how we can follow a public script without inter-
nalizing it into a mental script.  
The enactivist account can shed new light on these worries. Enactivism challenges both 
the modularity and the decoupleability condition for elaborating pretend play. The alter-
native is to propose that the pretense is elaborated not via a represented action plan or a 
mental script, but that it is elaborated in the ongoing action as a response to environmental 
and social affordances for play, shaped by ongoing social interactions.25 Counter decou-
pleability: responsiveness to new affordances provided by the social context at play 
drives the elaboration of play. Counter modularity: one does not need to posit internalized 
rules of behavior; one simply re-enacts experienced routines (i.e., the practices that are 
called for) in play.26  
According to the enactive view, social affordances can explain how play can be guided 
without following mental scripts. Responding to others, or social attunement, is one aspect 
of the ongoing play elaboration. Creating new meanings together is another. Other people 
                                                        
25 This proposal sounds like play is completely steered by the environment and not internally guided. For exam-
ple, “reenacting experienced routines” sounds like re-executing routines stored in memory from previous in-
stances, and thereby guided by some mental model. However, enactivists do not offload cognition to the 
environment, and need not deny internal mechanisms playing relevant roles. A proposal for such mechanisms 
will be made in Section 7. Also, an enactivist account of how memory works is important, but providing one is 
beyond the scope of this paper. All that enactivists should deny are special mental models, such as SPMs, to be 
part of the cognitive architecture. 
26 An enactivist account of memory is needed to further this argument. See Hutto & Peeters (2018) on radically 
enactive recollecting. 
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enable “stepping away” from everyday practice and guide new play practices. In creating 
an intersubjective context, they directly affect the actions of the playing individual.27 First, 
they can do so through direct engagement in play with the child. For example, parents 
show how to “pretend call” from a banana, or how to “pretend drink” from a cup, which 
the child imitates. Imitation and over-imitation plays a crucial role for shaping pretense 
(see Section 6). But explicit guidance is not always necessary. In joint action, new af-
fordances get solicited in the action that would not be available to the individual. For ex-
ample, a banana held by a single child can solicit a phone, but held by two children, who 
each hold one end of the banana, can solicit a little swing, together enacting new possibil-
ities for play.28  
Moreover, others play a structuring role through their mere presence in the vicinity of the 
play context (Rucińska, 2017). The structuring of play can be indirect; others who are 
spectators of play produce constant emotional feedback, such as smiling, which is re-
sponded to by the pretender as an invitation to continue the game. For example, when a 
child is exploring ways to play “tea party,” the smiles, gestures and actions of caregivers 
or fellow playmates reassure the child in what he or she is doing. When the mother smiles 
at a toy, the toddler smiles at that toy as well, while if the mother shows to be frightened 
of the toy, the toddler is then wary of the toy. The phenomenon has been called “social 
referencing.”29 Thus, mere presence of others can drive pretend “phone” play with a ba-
nana: the parents of a child interacting with a banana could make the child’s acting on 
“phone” affordances more likely by smiling and approving the various ways the child 
explores the object at hand. How the spectator shapes the play is especially visible in a 
game of charades.  
De Jaegher & Di Paolo (2007) discuss the case of playing charades together in the context 
of Participatory Sense Making, a theory about how we make sense of others through co-
ordinated interaction. It could be said that different affordances become present to the 
actor depending on the responsiveness of the teammates. The actors tend to adjust their 
                                                        
27 This is in line with Vygotsky’s theory of supervised activity (1978): the “The Zone of Proximal Development” 
captures the structure of dialogical interactions whereby children extend the range of their comptences through 
experts’ supervision. 
28 One example of successful elaboration of play is seen in systemic dialogical therapy, where the therapists help 
clients get out of their destructive routines or habitual ways of looking at and interacting with the world, though 
sustained conversation and joint play. As Rucińska & Reijmers (2014) suggest, in play therapy we find therapists 
and clients who try to create new meanings together; playing “adds and reinforces the [existing] narratives, al-
lowing new perceptions and meanings to be created through the use of objects and interaction with the therapist” 
(p. 39). 
29 In Klinnert et al.’s (1983) “visual cliff” experiment, two-year-olds had to crawl over visually present “drop” 
under a transparent glass cover. The experiment found that toddlers were reluctant to continue crawling, unless 
their mothers’ faces showed approval. As Astington (1994) comments, “In such a situation their behaviour can 
be influenced by the expression on their mother’s face. If she smiles cheerfully the baby is encouraged to crawl 
over the glass but if she looks fearful he will not cross” (p. 40). 
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behaviors in relation to the spectators: seeing that their audience does not understand the 
act or gesture (e.g., “bird in flight”), the actors adjust their behavior to accommodate the 
understanding of the spectators, and explore other means of depicting the same thing (e.g., 
if flapping hands up and down does not work, one tries something else). In that sense, the 
reactions of others bring forth novel affordances to be inviting to the pretender. This is 
supported by recent studies, which show that infant’s understanding of others is more ro-
bust in interactive contexts; these contexts indicate the significant importance of second-
person interactions for cognitive and social development (De Jaegher et al., 2010).30  
How do specific affordances get solicited? Canonical play affordances (Costall, 2012) are 
the first to strongly invite, or solicit action: 
For example, an animal’s feeding practices set up the bananas to canonically afford ‘eating,’ 
but at times of winter, it can set them up for ‘storing.’ The canonical affordances are shaped 
by wider socio-cultural context, such as past practices. Canonical affordances can explain 
some pretense. One way to think about pretense being canonical is thinking of it as stepping 
into another practice, such as from ‘banana-eating’ practice to socially established ‘banana-
phone game’ practice. (Rucińska, 2017, p. 271) 
Even when playing alone, a child at play brings forward, or re-enacts, past interactions in 
the form of embodied routines that are enacted on novel objects. Since the child has a his-
tory of interactions with a caregiver, who has approved or disapproved certain forms of 
play by reacting (e.g., with laughter and encouragement, or the opposite), the child is taught 
what actions are acceptable in play and how to depict these actions so that others understand 
and accept this play. It is the expectations of how to play a bird in flight, and a commitment 
to accepted ways of playing “birds,” that guides the play, as opposed to internal mental 
representations of “birds.” A history of interactions guides how the child pretends now, as 
it shapes the affordances for social engagements that are present in the play context. As 
social engagements are always normative, and the child enacts normative ways of playing, 
this makes sociality a candidate for an enabler of pretense extended in time. Re-enacting 
routines in play is not less of a socially constituted act when playing alone, just as inner 
speech is not less of a social act because it is directed at the self (Geurts, 2018).31  
Enactivists can therefore propose that pretense routines or elaborations need not be done 
in distinct mental architectures or SPMs that separate reality from fiction. SPMs that al-
low for script elaboration are not needed as one follows routines observed or imitated 
                                                        
30 To clarify the role of others in shaping the animal–environment dynamic, consider an analogy to being vul-
nerable. McKitrick (2003) discusses how objects like sensors can make a city less vulnerable to an attack; It is 
the dynamic between the city and its attackers (not between the city and the sensors) that is changed by the 
sensors (161). The point is simply that other people (just as objects) can influence the dynamic between the 
environmental affordances and others without being the focus of that dynamic themselves (Rucińska, 2017).  
31 As Geurts points out, social acts such as “asking, telling, promising, and reminding” get transformed into 
private acts when addressed not to others but to oneself; “they come to function as modes of thinking: wondering, 
making up one’s mind, motivating oneself, and so on” (2018, p. 272). My suggestion is that a similar pattern is 
visible with pretend games, which involve re-enactments of social behavior. 
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from the environment one has participated in, the affordances for which are present in 
the context of play. Keeping track between reality and fiction is also not needed to save 
the child form being confused about being at play. The social context (including gaze of 
others and intersubjective setting up of a play environment) is the verifier of the condition 
of the play situation.  
Are scripts even necessary at all? Enactivists will follow Ryle’s (1949) insight that there 
are not two processes happening, whereby the first is “mental” and the latter is merely 
motoric. As Ryle describes the traditional doctrine, in the “bear” pretense,  
it is not denied that the child is doing lots of other things as well; he roars, he pads around 
the floor, he gnashes his teeth [...] His noises and antics may be a help to his picturing, or 
they may be special effects of it, but it is not in making these noises, or performing these 
antics, that he is exercising his imagination, but only in his ‘seeing,’ ‘hearing,’ ‘smelling,’ 
‘tasting,’ and ‘feeling’ things which are not there to be perceived. [...] Put as bluntly as this, 
the doctrine is patently absurd. (p. 243) 
According to Ryle, “the child is not doing two things at once, any more than I, in quoting 
you, am saying two things at once” (p. 246). Following Ryle’s insights, thinking that gen-
uine pretense lies in the making of a mental script that delineates action in advance of that 
action, is a category mistake.  
To summarize, the alternative proposed in this paper suggests that one enacts a routine 
without following scripts. Routine re-enactments have many degrees of freedom and allow 
for exploration and creative responses to emerging affordances. Enactivism does not need 
to assume that the child has a system of understanding symbols and representing right 
meanings in order to engage in pretense; in reverse, the child engages in pretense first, 
which allows for new meanings and symbol systems to be put in place. Social pretense is 
achieved without pre-established constitutive rules; the rules of the game, if any exist, are 
negotiated on the go. And while children gradually learn to impose rules of the games, and 
can create explicit scripts (this is how one plays “tea parties”; “green pebbles now mean 
apples”), such script-making is not necessary in order to engage in pretense in the first 
place. Explicit scripts can be created to explicitly guide pretend activities, but they are not 
preconditions to being able to play in a directed way.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper proposed that engaging in make-believe, or creating new scenarios during pre-
tend games, is actively shaped by worldly and social affordances. According to the enac-
tive account, one learns how to see new affordances, or possibilities for action, through 
active engagement and interaction. Social interaction also affects seeing new possibilities 
for action. Applied to the pretense context, one learns to see new playful affordances of 
an object through exploratory play and playing with others, thereby learning about meta-
phoric meanings of objects through engaging in pretend play (as opposed to representing 
it in advance of pretend play). This proposal can account for acting in new and creative 
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(or at least non-standard) ways that is characteristic of pretending, without introducing 
special cognitive mechanisms such as quarantining, script elaborators or special imagina-
tive mechanisms to account for what guides pretense.32  
How does this proposal deal with the bypassing challenge? The “bypassing challenge” 
becomes moot. One does not bypass a “true stimulus” or a “correct representation” and 
opt for a non-standard response. One does not need to bypass the original meaning of 
objects, since only relevant meanings, including the pretend ones, come forth in play. The 
response that has been selected is not a less obvious one; the banana affords both forms of 
responses (“as banana” and “as phone”) equally, depending on the context one finds one-
self in.33 Once we learn of a practice, we see possibilities of acting it out in different situ-
ations, shifting to it without bypassing the standard situation.  
One may worry that the pretense situations will be less common, that a banana is more 
often encountered in “breakfast” context rather than “play” context, and so it should first 
and foremost afford “food,” not “phone” engagements (Rucińska, 2017, p. 272). But even 
if some form of “stepping away” or inhibition of responding to typical affordances were 
needed, it is not settled that the inhibiting must be achieved by a procedure that involves 
mental representations. As Varga (2011) proposed, referential opacity—knowing that 
what is pretended differs somehow from the real—is good enough for pretend play, and 
that knowledge could be seen as knowing “how” to play and recognize playful contexts 
based on affective and intersubjective skills: 
[P]retence is seen as a result of giving a coincidental object a new and temporary description, 
which emerges out of shared intentionality. [...] Pretence therefore involves the collective 
creation of new temporary functions. (p. 49) 
The enactive proposal suggests that the temporary functions are not “absent functions” 
that were internalized earlier and now need to be brought forth as representations, but 
simply different ways of engaging with an object, ways that become present in the specific 
temporal context of play. 
                                                        
32 The enactive view proposes to think of pretending in terms of there being only one reality, in which a given 
object simply takes on new functions, determined by the need of the game. There is nothing special about pre-
tense that requires the positing of another imaginary “reality” and storing such descriptions in the shape of mental 
scripts. Instead, the enactivist proposal is that we switch between different ways of treating the object , and not 
between true vs. fictional representations of objects. For example, we switch from engaging in the routine of 
treating bananas “as food” to routines of treating bananas “as phones,” stepping from the everyday context into 
a playful context, and back to everyday context at the end of play. Similarly, we switch from acting out a long-
term role (being a child, a student, a father) to a short-term role (being a “king” or a “bear” as loosely inspired 
by narratives about kings or bears). Just as we shift our roles from being conference speakers to listening partic-
ipants in the context of a conference, or from mothers to daughters depending on the family members we interact 
with, so we shift from typical use of objects to playful use of objects.  
33 The response to engage with a banana as if it were a phone is afforded in the context of phone play, constitu-
tively shaped by social norms and further enabled by social interactions. Pretense entails prior familiarity with 
the phone practice, which is over-imitated on a banana. As the phone practice is taught, enacted and fortified by 
using phones and other objects such as bananas, the bananas in turn gain social affordances (affordances bound 
to practices) perceptible in play circumstances that allow re-enacting the “phoning” activity. 
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One might still question whether enactivism can explain how we deal with absence. The 
worry might be that there is an absent referent when dealing with pretense. As Harris & 
Kavanaugh (1993) claim, “In Piaget’s terms, Jacqueline [who acts as if a cloth were a 
pillow—added comment] treats the cloth as a symbol—it serves as a signifier whose ref-
erent (or signified) is the absent pillow” (p. 68). The idea is that we encounter absence in 
the first place, and we must stand back from the immediate environment. Imagination and 
mental scripts are brought in to explain how we can deal with absence. Representations 
are supposed to act as stand-ins during the period without direct stimulus so that we can 
refer to something that is not there. Scripts provide plans for action in the absence of ex-
plicit guiders for play. Both are supposed to explain why play is not random.  
A way to address this worry is to show that the worry is misguided; enactivism does not 
assume absence to be represented in pretend play at all. In the case of pretending that, for 
example, a box is a “car,” the “car” need not be represented because there is no absence 
of it to begin with. What one is directly seeing is the box as a present affordance for ways 
of acting as if it is a car. What happens is that in manipulation of the object, a car scenario 
is enacted. There is no absent car one needs to refer to, but a present metaphor “car” that 
is enacted. It is not clear whether pretend play deals with any absence from the immediate 
environment to begin with. It is highly questionable whether the agent ever acts inde-
pendently of what is seen. Even in pretend play one responds to present affordances for 
social interaction, instead of representing absences. In play-acting a bear, the child is not 
enacting the bear out of absence (as if there is a bear someplace else that the child has to 
distinguish from what he is doing); he is presenting a bear in his actions. The enactive 
account suggests re-characterizing absence as presence extended in time, whereby one re-
enacts, or brings forth in experience, familiar or desired situations. With slight additions, 
re-enactments can lead to the creation of new routines. Thus, even if there is no explicit 
prop to be manipulated, the play is rarely acted out solely in the head of the pretender; 
other objects and situations in the world still afford various forms of play.  
 
7. Follow-up: What is in Play without the SPMs? 
The enactive account of pretense, which captures the necessarily social nature of pretense, 
does not aim to serve only as a re-description of the cognitive phenomenon of pretending. 
It suggests proposals for the enactive cognitive science of pretense that look for explana-
tions of the phenomena in the right places. One such proposal is that to explain pretending, 
we should move away from positing SPMs, and instead look for other cognitive skills and 
mechanisms that might explain how pretense is possible. The story of how pretense is 
possible will, in my view, include triangulation, (over-)imitation, affective responding and 
predictive processing. Why they are important for pretense will be explored briefly below.  
An account of how pretense is possible will need to include an explanation of the intersub-
jective capacity for triangulation with, and attunement to, others, which is the basis for all 
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social engagements. We should better understand what makes the capacity for intersubjec-
tivity possible, instead of looking for theory of mind mechanisms, to understand pretense. 
For example, development of shared intentionality may be one of the settings that allows 
one to pretend under a specific description. Dismissal of the “bypassing challenge” moti-
vates looking further at attunement to others that could be sufficient for referential opacity.  
Another factor to be examined is the capacity for imitation and the occurrence of over-
imitation.34 Over-imitation includes replicating ineffective means, or ones that are causally 
irrelevant, to one’s goal (Gies, 2016). Motivated to match fine-grained features of an adult’s 
behavior instead of playing correctly, children over-imitate, or faithfully replicate arbitrary 
features of, an adult’s behavior (Zawidzki, 2013), and in the safe space of play context, re-
enact the learned behaviors to practice and test their appropriateness. Representational trig-
gers, such as having to represent the goal of an action and recognize the purposefulness of 
such action, need not be necessarily in place in order to engage in over-imitation. 
The complete story should include the basic affective “appetite” for interaction. Affective 
states (such as feelings of trust or good moods) are needed for affordances to shape further 
play. Newborns are said to develop emotion-based communicative skills (Anderson et al., 
2001), which shows in eye-to-eye contact with the speaker, turning of heads towards the 
speakers, and smiling when played with. They also engage in hedonic responding, which 
is based on affections (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). It explains why newborns show 
attraction to other people and respond to their smiles. According to Reddy & Morris 
(2004), developmental findings suggest that playful moods can be easily picked up on by 
children starting with neo-natal imitation. They conclude that the best explanation of their 
findings lays in playfulness being directly experienced rather than inferred thanks to min-
dreading or script-following skills. The affective drive for play can explain why only 
“good enough” play is sufficient for pretense.  
Finally, clarification of how perception works can further be augmented by predictive pro-
cessing theory. Predictive processing refers to the idea that brains constantly guess, or pre-
dict, the ongoing stream of sensory input, including the inputs that should result from their 
own next actions and worldly interventions. The mechanism supports perception and action 
by constantly attempting to match incoming sensory inputs with top-down expectations or 
predictions. According to Clark (2016), prediction-driven learning delivers a grip upon af-
fordances, or possibilities for action and intervention that the environment makes available. 
The idea of creating structures or schemas within which behavior becomes more mutually 
predictable is captured by the notion of “designer environments” as well (Clark, 2016). If 
pretense is more of a perceptual phenomenon than we previously thought, predictive pro-
cessing could further explain how one can see affordances for pretense engagements.  
                                                        
34 It is likely that for the pretense to take-off, children must be good imitators. According to Tomasello (1999), 
imitative abilities emerge in development from animacy and mimicry, fitting onto a specific time of life from 
birth to about six years of age. Mimicry is a likely first step towards individual pretense due to its developmental 
priority (Stern, 1985; Tomasello, 1999). 
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Though these cognitive capacities may not be sufficient, none of them require invoking 
SPMs. The enactive view leaves room for a wide explanation that involves sociality (social 
roles playing enabling roles for pretending that are diachronically extended in time) and 
makes room for other cognitive mechanisms to be part of the overall explanatory story 
(attunement, imitation, affect or prediction-making processes), without presupposing spe-
cial cognitive architecture of pretense.  
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Rucińska, Z. (2014). Basic Pretending as Sensorimotor Engagement? Lessons from Sensorimotor 
Theory for the Debate on Pretence. In J.M. Bishop & A.O. Martin (Eds.) Contemporary Sen-
sorimotor Theory: A brief introduction (pp. 175–187). Cham, Switzerland: Springer Interna-
tional Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05107-9_12  
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